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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
Jose Manuel Sanchez appeals from the district court's summary dismissal 
of his petition for post-conviction relief, and denial of his request for appointment 
of post-conviction counsel. 
Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings 
A jury convicted Jose Manuel Sanchez of 112 counts of aggravated 
battery. State v. Sanchez, Unpublished Opinion No. 415, pp. 1-4 (Ct. App. 
2011). The victim of his crimes is Sharon Tusi, with whom he was in a sexual 
relationship from 1992 to 2007. kl At trial, the state put on evidence of 
Sanchez's escalating psychological and physical abuse of Tusi. kl Within the 
first year, Sanchez accused Tusi of having sex with other men, and convinced 
Tusi that he had people watching her who would scalp her for her promiscuous 
conduct. lg. at 2. Fearing graphic threats of torture by the "people," Tusi obeyed 
"their" command to shave her own head, eyebrows, eyelashes and crotch. kl 
Starting in 1993, Sanchez physically beat Tusi, forcing her to falsely 
confess to accusations that she had had sex with others. kl at 3. By 2007, 
Sanchez convinced Tusi to pull out her own teeth, or the people would do it for 
her. Id. In August 2007, Tusi allowed Sanchez to attempt to sew her vagina 
shut, to stop her alleged infidelities. kl Believing she could save her life and 
placate Sanchez and the people, Tusi suggested burning her buttocks, abdomen 
and vagina in the shape of a bikini, as a "solution" to her unfaithfulness. kl at 4. 
Every day for four months, Sanchez burned Tusi in this way. kl Finally, in 
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December 2007, Tusi told her daughter about the burnings, but asked her not to 
tell anyone yet ~ That night after Sanchez burned Tusi, the two struggled and 
Sanchez began beating Tusi; Tusi managed to call her daughter, who 
immediately contacted the police. ~ The police arrived within minutes and 
arrested Sanchez. ~ 
The district court sentenced Sanchez to a prison term of 24 years fixed 
and eight indeterminate. (R., pp. 1, 61, 104.) Sanchez appealed, and the Idaho 
Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction. State v. 
Sanchez, Unpublished Opinion No. 415 (Ct. App. 2011 ). 
Sanchez filed a petition and supporting affidavit for post-conviction relief. 
(R., pp. 1-15.) In it he asserted 12 errors of law by the trial court, a constitutional 
challenge to his sentence, four claims of ineffective assistance by trial counsel, 
and a claim of ineffective assistance by appellate counsel. (R., pp. 2-11.) 
Sanchez also requested appointment of counsel to assist with his post-conviction 
matter. (R., pp. 16-18.) The district court denied appointment of counsel, 
reasoning that Sanchez's petition includes "no allegation in the petition 
that raises the possibility of a valid claim such that appointment of counsel is 
appropriate." (R., pp. 26-31.) After consideration of Sanchez's petition (R., pp. 
1-12), the state's answer (R., pp. 60-63) and motion for summary dismissal (R., 
p. 66-67), and Sanchez's opposition to dismissal (R., pp. 69-73), the district court 
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entered a Decision On Motion for Summary Dismissal (R., pp. 99-1151). 
Sanchez now timely appeals. (R., pp. 117, 119-121.) 
1 The district court's decision appears to be mIssIng part of at least one 
sentence, between pages six and seven, in the Standard of Review section. (R., 
pp. 104-05.) None of the district court's analysis of the issues is missing. 
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ISSUES 
Sanchez, representing himself, states the issues on appeal as: 
1. Did the prosecuting attorney properly preserve issues 
presented by Appellant in his Answer and Motion Dismiss? 
2. Are issues presented in this Post-conviction claims viable 
claims under Unified Post-conviction Relief? 
3. Did the district court exceed its authority to supplement 
prosecutor's 1 page Dismissal? 
4. Did the district court err in not appointing counsel in the post-
conviction? 
5. Was petitioner-appellant denied his 6th Amendment Right to 
Counsel at trial, appeal and post-convict? 
6. Did the district court deny Appellant numerous rights at trial? 
(which the Court would not address) (Clerks record #2 thru 
#7) 
(Appellant's brief, p. 10 (verbatim).) 
The state rephrases the issues as: 
1. Did Sanchez fail to assert a viable claim so as to warrant appointment of 
post-conviction counsel? 
2. Has Sanchez failed to show error in the district court's summary dismissal 
of his post-conviction petition? 
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ARGUMENT 
I. 
Sanchez Failed To Assert A Viable Claim So As To Warrant Appointment Of 
Post-Conviction Counsel 
A Introduction 
Sanchez contends the district court erred in denying his motion to appoint 
post-conviction counsel, filed contemporaneously with his petition. (R., pp. 16-
19.) However, Sanchez's petition raised no claim with a reasonable chance of 
survival, even with assistance of counsel. As shown herein, applicable law thus 
supports the district court's decision denying counsel. 
B. Legal Standard 
"If a post-conviction petitioner is unable to pay for legal representation, the 
trial court may appoint counsel at public expense." I.C. § 19-4904; Judd v. State, 
148 Idaho 22, 24, 218 P.3d 1, 3 (2009). Whether to appoint counsel is in the 
court's discretion. Melton v. State, 148 Idaho 339, 341, 223 P.3d 281, 283 
(2009) (citation omitted). Before denying a petition on the merits, the court must 
first determine, upon careful consideration of the request for representation, if 
petitioner is entitled to court-appointed counsel. kl at 342, 223 P.3d at 284. 
The district court should appoint counsel if the post-conviction petition's 
allegations show "the possibility of a valid claim such that a reasonable person 
with adequate means would be willing to retain counsel to conduct a further 
investigation into the claim." Melton, 148 Idaho at 342, 223 P.3d at 284 (quoting 
Swader v. State, 143 Idaho 651, 654-55, 152 P.3d 12, 15-16 (2007)). Stated 
another way, the court considers whether petitioner could "properly allege the 
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necessary supporting facts" if given notice of the court's intent to dismiss and "an 
opportunity with counsel." Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 793, 102 P.3d 
1108, 1112 (2004) (Charboneau I). 
Arguing that the district court erred in failing to appoint post-conviction 
counsel, Sanchez cites Martinez v. Ryan, 132 S. Ct. 1309 (2012). The Martinez 
court held that inadequate counsel in state post-conviction proceedings may 
establish cause for failure to raise ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims in 
later federal habeas proceedings. kt Sanchez's matter is not now before a 
federal habeas court. Also, Sanchez raised ineffective assistance of trial 
counsel claims in his post-conviction petition. (R., pp. 8-9.) Thus, Martinez is 
inapposite. 
Under applicable case law, Sanchez's claims were either barred or plainly 
unsupported as a matter of law. 
C. Claims Barred By Res Judicata 
Where issues have been raised and considered on direct appeal, they are 
barred from further consideration under res judicata. Parrott v. State, 117 Idaho 
272, 274, 787 P.2d 258, 260 (1990). Most of Sanchez's allegations of erroneous 
evidentiary rulings were raised and decided on direct appeal. See Sanchez, 
Unpublished Opinion No. 415 (Ct. App. 2011 ). These allegations concerned 
"prior bad acts, relevancy, prejudice, psychiatric expert testimony, domestic 
violence expert testimony, and motion to sever." (R., p. 3-5, 9-10, 109 n.19.) 
Because the Court of Appeals already considered and ruled on these issues, 
they are barred under res judicata. Parrott, 117 Idaho at 27 4, 787 P .2d at 260. 
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D. Claims Barred Under I.C. § 19-4901 (b) 
A post-conviction petition's claim that could have been raised on direct 
appeal but was not is barred unless it raises "a substantial doubt about the 
reliability of the finding of guilt and could not, in the exercise of due diligence, 
have been presented earlier." I.C. § 19-4901 (b); Hedger v. State, 124 Idaho 49, 
51, 855 P.2d 886, 888 (Ct. App. 1993) (affirming summary dismissal even where 
claim asserted fundamental error). In his post-conviction petition, Sanchez 
argued the trial court erred in allowing un-credible testimony by Tusi about self-
torture, and that Sanchez committed battery 112 times even though she recalled 
only a few specific incidents. (R, pp. 3-7.) Also in his petition, Sanchez claimed 
that his sentence of 24 years fixed for a "60 year old crippled man . . . for 
exercising his right to go to trial" was "cruel and unusual punishment." (R., p. 
11.) Sanchez did not raise these issues on direct appeal. 
In support of these claims, Sanchez's petition provided only conclusory, 
non-specific allegations. (R., pp. 1-15.) Other than his own self-serving affidavit, 
he failed to present evidence that his allegations were valid. (R., pp. 14-15.) 
Regarding Sanchez's claim of cruel and unusual punishment, the district court 
noted, "there is nothing in the record in the underlying criminal case or in [the] 
post-conviction proceeding to suggest that the sentence resulted from Sanchez's 
exercise of his right to go to trial." (R., p. 113.) Sanchez thus failed to 
demonstrate either a "substantial doubt" about the jury's finding of his guilt, or a 
reason why these issues could not have been raised on direct appeal. See 
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Hedger, 124 Idaho at 51, 855 P.2d at 888. His assertions of trial court error are 
therefore barred. I.C. § 19-4901 (b); Hedger, 124 Idaho at 51, 855 P.2d at 888. 
E. Ineffective Assistance Of Counsel Claims Fail 
In his post-conviction petition, Sanchez raised claims of ineffective 
assistance by both trial and appellate counsel. (R., pp. 2, 8-10.) Issues 
concerning the effectiveness of counsel are appropriately raised in post-
conviction. Hernandez v. State, 132 Idaho 352, 355, 972 P.2d 730, 733 (Ct. 
App. 1998). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner 
must show both that his counsel performed deficiently, and that his defense was 
prejudiced as a result. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 
(2010) (citing Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984)). The claimant 
has the burden of showing that counsel's representation fell below an objective 
standard of reasonableness, Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688, and but for counsel's 
deficient performance, it is reasonably probable the outcome would have been 
different, kl at 694. There is a strong presumption that counsel has performed 
competently. kl at 690. 
1. Trial Counsel 
In his post-conviction petition, Sanchez asserted three ineffective 
assistance of trial counsel arguments: (1) failure to win a pre-trial motion or to 
properly preserve the issue regarding exclusion of evidence that Tusi removed 
her own teeth; (2) failure to preserve the issue of excluding testimony about 
abuse from 1992 through 2007; and (3) failure to preserve an objection to the 
state's psychiatric expert witnesses. (R., p. 8-10.) As the district court properly 
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found, these issues were preserved by trial counsel, and raised by appellate 
counsel. (R., pp. 111-13.) The Court of Appeals considered the issues, 
ultimately deciding against Sanchez on each. Sanchez, Unpublished Opinion 
No. 415, pp. 5-13 (Ct. App. 2011). Thus, Sanchez failed to satisfy either 
element of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, that counsel performed 
deficiently or that his defense was prejudiced. As to trial counsel, the claim 
unmistakably fails. 
2. Appellate Counsel 
Sanchez's post-conviction petition also asserted his appellate counsel 
performed deficiently by failing to petition to the Supreme Court for review of the 
Court of Appeals decision. (R., p. 2.) This claim fails because Supreme Court 
review of a Court of Appeals decision is purely discretionary. I.AR. 118(b). 
There is no constitutional right to counsel to pursue discretionary review of an 
appellate decision.2 Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600, 615 (1974). Thus, counsel's 
failure to pursue discretionary review of an appellate decision does not deprive a 
defendant of constitutionally mandated effective assistance of counsel. Jakoski 
v. State, 136 Idaho 280, 286, 32 P.3d 672, 678 (Ct. App. 2001 ). As to appellate 
counsel, the claim also fails. 
2 To the extent that Sanchez may argue counsel failed to exhaust state remedies 
precluding his ability to bring a federal habeas corpus claim, this argument fails 
because Sanchez has suggested no basis on which he could collaterally attack 
his conviction; Sanchez thus fails to show prejudice. See Hernandez v. State, 
127 Idaho 685,688, 905 P.2d 86, 89 (1995). 
9 
F. Post-Conviction Counsel Properly Denied 
For these reasons, Sanchez failed to state a sufficient claim to warrant 
appointment of post-conviction counsel. Accordingly, the district court properly 
denied Sanchez's request. 
11. 
Sanchez Has Failed To Show Error In The District Court's Summary Dismissal 
Of His Post-Conviction Petition 
A. Introduction 
Having failed to satisfy the lower standard of a claim warranting 
appointment of counsel, Sanchez cannot meet his burden of showing the district 
court erred in summarily dismissing his petition. To the extent that Sanchez 
asserts lack of notice, this argument also fails. 
B. Standard Of Review 
When reviewing a district court's summary dismissal of a petition for post-
conviction relief, the appellate court applies the same standard as that applied by 
the district court. Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 675, 227 P.3d 925, 929 
(2010). Petitions for post-conviction relief under Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedure Act, I.C. § 19-4901 et seq., are governed by Idaho's Rules of Civil 
Procedure. kl at 674, 227 P.3d at 928 (citation omitted). But to avoid dismissal, 
a petition must state more than that required under Rule 8(a)(1). kl It must 
provide specific grounds on which the application is based, along with admissible 
supporting evidence. kl at 675, 227 P.3d at 929 (citation omitted); I.C. § 19-
4903. 
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The district court may, on a party's motion or its own initiative, summarily 
dismiss (without a hearing) a petition for post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19-4906; 
Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675, 227 P.3d at 929. The procedure for summary 
dismissal is equivalent to that for a summary judgment motion under I.R.C.P. 56. 
Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675, 227 P.3d at 929 (citation omitted). Thus, dismissal is 
appropriate on determination that no "genuine issue of fact exists based on the 
pleadings, depositions and admissions together with any affidavits on file." kt 
The court will regard petitioner's undisputed factual allegations as true, id. 
(citation omitted), and "will liberally construe the facts and reasonable inferences 
in favor of the non-moving party," Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 903, 174 
P.3d 870, 873 (2007) (Charboneau II). However, the court need not accept 
"mere conclusory allegations[ ] unsupported by admissible evidence, or the 
applicant's conclusions of law." Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 675, 227 P.3d at 929 
(citation omitted). 
C. Dismissal Was Pursuant To The State's Motion 
Where the district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction petition on 
its own motion, without motion from the state, a petitioner is entitled to notice of 
the basis for the dismissal, and 20 days to respond. I.C. § 19-4906(b). If the 
state moves to dismiss, the motion serves as notice for which petitioner may 
respond under I.C. § 19-4906(c). Buss v. State, 147 Idaho 514, 517, 211 P.3d 
123, 126 (Ct. App. 2009). However, if the district court dismisses on grounds 
other than those stated in the state's motion, the petitioner must be given notice 
and an opportunity to respond pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(b). kt 
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Here, the state filed a motion for summary dismissal. (R., pp. 66-67.) 
Although brief, the motion asserted that Sanchez's petition "fails to raise a 
genuine issue of material fact" with regard to his ineffective assistance of 
counsel and other claims. (R., p. 66.) According to the state, Sanchez's claims 
are "bare or conclusory, unsubstantiated by fact, procedurally defaulted, or 
clearly disproved by the record." (R., p. 66.) The district court ultimately 
dismissed Sanchez's petition on these same grounds, albeit with more detail. 
(R., pp. 109-14.) 
In its decision on motion for summary judgment, the district court 
addressed procedural default, stating, "Many of Sanchez's claims were or could 
have been raised in the criminal proceedings or on direct appeal and are not 
proper for post-conviction proceedings." (R., p. 109.) The district court also 
noted that the record failed to support Sanchez's ineffective assistance of 
counsel claims. (R., pp. 110-13.) As to Sanchez's cruel and unusual 
punishment claim, the district court again pointed to the lack of support in the 
record. (R., p. 113.) 
The district court relied on additional grounds, not identified in the state's 
motion, in dismissing Sanchez's claims. For example, as to ineffective 
assistance of appellate counsel, the district court cited Jakoski, 136 Idaho 280, 
32 P.3d 672, discussed in Section l(E)(2) of this brief. (R., p. 110.) Regarding 
Sanchez's arguments of trial court error, the district court noted that the Court of 
Appeals had already decided the issues, thus acknowledging application of res 
judicata, addressed in Section l(C) of this brief. (R., pp. 112-13.) "When a 
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district court summarily dismisses a post-conviction application, relying in part on 
the same grounds presented by the state in its motion for summary dismissal, 
the notice requirement [of I.C. § 19-4906] has been met." Buss, 147 Idaho at 
517, 211 P.3d at 126 (citation omitted). Although the district court here relied in-
part on grounds not identified in the state's motion, it also relied on grounds 
raised by the state. Under Buss, Sanchez was provided the required notice 
under I.C. § 19-4906. 
Importantly, Sanchez did file a reply, opposing dismissal. (R., pp. 69-
73.) The reply was filed after the state's answer (R., pp. 60-63) and motion to 
dismiss (R., pp. 66-67), as well as the district court's order denying counsel (R., 
pp. 26-31 ), which forecasted a dismissal for failure to state a valid claim. (R., p. 
31.) Nothing in Sanchez's reply suggests a request for clarification concerning 
the state's arguments. (R., pp. 69-73.) Sanchez's reply in fact reflects that the 
goals of statutory notice and an opportunity to respond were satisfied. 
D. Claim Of Court Bias 
In his appellate brief, Sanchez asserts, "bias is evident" where the court 
appears to "put[ ] the blame on an elderly mexican national [Sanchez]." 
(Appellant's brief, p. 14.) This conclusory allegation lacks further detail or even 
an indication of the court or stage of proceedings to which it is directed. Given 
the complete absence of evidentiary support, this Court should reject the claim 
as unsubstantiated. 
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CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests that the Court affirm the district court's 
denial of Sanchez's motion to appoint counsel and petition for post-conviction 
relief. 
DATED this 13th day of May, 2013. 
DA~ 
Deputy Attorney General 
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